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The present study sought to (1) determine whether Barrett’s counterintuitives coding and 
quantifying scheme (CI-Scheme) could be applied to cultural materials with sufficient inter-
coder reliability, (2) provide evidence concerning just how counterintuitive is too 
counterintuitive for a concept to be a recurrent cultural idea, and (3) test whether counterintuitive 
intentional agent concepts are more common in folktales than other classes of counterintuitive 
concepts.  Seventy-three folktales from around the world were sampled from larger collections.  
Using Barrett’s CI-Scheme, two independent coders identified 116 counterintuitive objects and 
scored them for degree of counterintuitiveness with very high inter-rater concordance.  Seventy-
nine percent of folktales had one or two counterintuitive objects.  Of the counterintuitive objects 
93 percent had a counterintuitiveness score of only one.  Ninety-eight percent of counterintuitive 
objects were agents.  Results suggest the CI-Scheme may have utility for analyzing cultural 
materials, that the cognitive optimum for cultural transmission falls around one counterintuitive 
feature, and that counterintuitive agents are more common than other types of counterintuitive 
objects in folktales.   
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Exploring the transmission of cultural ideas and the underlying cognitive mechanisms 
that generate and maintain these ideas continues to be a popular area of research. Cultural ideas 
or concepts are those that are shared or transmitted within a group and are largely spread through 
human interaction and behavior via human cognitive architecture (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004).  
Examining this conceptual architecture in relation to cultural transmission is central to 
understanding which ideas are likely to stabilize as cultural forms and become common across 
cultures.  Pascal Boyer’s theory of transmission of counterintuitive ideas, here termed the 
Minimal Counterintuitiveness (MCI) theory, suggests that ideas that are counter to our intuitive 
expectations (including many religious, mythical or fictional ideas) strike a balance between 
being readily understood because of a sturdy intuitive conceptual foundation and being attention 
demanding because of their novelty and unusual inferential potential (Boyer, 2003; Boyer & 
Ramble, 2001; Sperber, 1996).  As a result, these minimally or modestly ‘counterintuitive’ ideas 
are likely memorable and have a cultural transmission advantage over other concepts (Boyer & 
Ramble, 2001). Boyer hypothesizes that concepts with a small number of counterintuitive 
properties are better remembered than both wholly intuitive concepts (because they are typically 
too mundane to attract attention) and extremely counterintuitive concepts (because they are 
difficult to represent) (Boyer, 2003; Boyer & Ramble, 2001).  
Several studies using memory experiments have examined Boyer’s prediction that 
slightly or ‘minimally’ counterintuitive ideas are generally remembered better than completely 
intuitive ideas (e.g. Barrett and Nyhof, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Gonce et al., 2006; 
Pyysiäinen, Lindeman, & Honkela, 2003; Upal et al., 2007).  Though the earliest experiments 
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found the predicted mnemonic and transmission advantage for minimally counterintuitive ideas 
(e.g. with only a single counterintuitive feature) over non-counterintuitive control items (Barrett 
& Nyhof, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001), more recent experiments have yielded mixed results.  
These experiments have raised the possibility that the MCI advantage either operates only on the 
level of narratives (Norenzayan et al., 2006), is dependent upon embedding the concept in 
narrative structures (Gonce et al., 2006),  or is a product of inferential potential rather than 
counterintuitiveness per se (Gregory & Barrett, forthcoming). It may be that inconsistency in 
findings is due to inconsistency in how counterintuitive ideas and concepts are operationalized 
(e.g., Gonce et al., 2006; Norenzayan et al., 2006; Tweney et al., 2006). 
Even if one end of the proposed cognitive optimum has only modest psychological 
support, the other tail is indubitable: extremely complex, massively counterintuitive ideas are 
difficult to remember and transmit faithfully.  Nevertheless, the proposed cognitive optimum 
theory certainly leaves open an important question regarding implications for cultural 
transmission: Where does the cognitive optimum of counterintuitiveness fall?  How many 
counterintuitive features are too many to be successfully remembered, transmitted, and become a 
recurrent, shared cultural representation? 
The present study attempts to advance research concerning the cognitive optimum/MCI 
theory in two ways.  First, we present and attempt to validate Barrett’s recently-advanced 
counterintuitiveness coding and quantification scheme (the CI-Scheme, henceforth) (Barrett, 
2008).  For the MCI theory to continue to be fruitful in the study of cognition and culture, the 
ambiguity regarding how to identify (or generate) public representations of counterintuitive 
concepts must be resolved.  Barrett has offered a scheme for resolving this ambiguity, but if the 
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scheme cannot be successfully applied to actual cultural materials with an acceptable degree of 
inter-coder reliability, the scheme’s utility is limited.  
In the present study, two coders with minimal training in the relevant concepts and no 
particular cultural expertise applied the CI-Scheme to a cross-cultural sampling of recorded 
folktales to test the CI-Scheme’s utility.  Second, through the resulting analysis of coded 
counterintuitive concepts represented in the folktales, we provide evidence concerning the degree 
of counterintuitiveness beyond which a concept is unlikely to become a widely recurrent cultural 
representation. 
Subsequent to Boyer’s development of the standard cognitive optimum/MCI theory, 
Boyer suggested that some counterintuitive ideas have more “inferential potential” than others.  
That is, they readily generate inferences, explanations, and predictions with little effort.  He 
identifies counterintuitive intentional agent concepts such as invisible or immortal persons as 
having particularly strong inferential potential (Boyer, 2001, 2003).  Boyer hypothesizes that 
these concepts rich in inferential potential are more memorable and likely to be successfully 
transmitted than other counterintuitive concepts.  If so, we might expect counterintuitive 
intentional agent concepts to be an overrepresented sub-category of counterintuitive concepts in 
cultural materials.  We test this prediction against the coded data from the sampled folktales: are 
counterintuitive agent concepts more common than other counterintuitive concepts? 
To summarize, the three primary aims of the current study are to: 
 
(1) Determine whether Barrett’s CI-Scheme can be applied to cultural materials 
(specifically written records of folktales) with sufficient inter-coder reliability, 
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(2) Provide evidence concerning just how counterintuitive is too counterintuitive for 
a concept to be a recurrent cultural idea, and 
(3) Test whether counterintuitive intentional agent concepts are more common in 
these cultural materials than other classes of counterintuitive concepts. 
 
 To test the CI-Scheme, we used a sample of folktales from around the world.  Myths, 
folktales, religious tales and similar narratives represent a common type of cultural 
representations that often feature counterintuitive items and, hence, are a good source of material 
to test the CI-Scheme.  As a cultural medium these tales are likely to contain concepts that have 
achieved ‘success’ by being passed down through various generations and if Boyer’s theory is 
correct, are likely to have maintained counterintuitive concepts at or near the hypothesized 
conceptual optimum. 
 Folktales are also cultural forms that, instead of relying on considerable cultural 
scaffolding (e.g. writing, rituals, or repeated teachings), have been successfully communicated 
and solidified through oral transmission. Verbal transmission is likely to be most successful if 
that which is spread, in this case folktales, is memorable and not extremely complicated. If the 
material is too complex, intricate, counterintuitive or difficult, it is unlikely that it will be 
accurately told, understood by an audience and retold.  Thus, the stabilizing and distilling of 
folktales into oral traditions and replicable cultural forms would have most likely required that 
the stories not be exceedingly complex, or exceedingly counterintuitive.  
 
Method 




Oxford University’s library database (OULS) was searched for collections of folktales. Inclusion 
criteria for collections were established a priori. Collections were included if they contained 
between forty and 100 folktales from one of the following geo-cultural regions: North America, 
South America, Mediterranean, Pacific, East Eurasia and Sub Saharan Africa. This was to ensure 
that the sample selected was balanced and represented culturally diverse populations.  
Once the collections were assembled, a representative sample of stories from each 
collection was selected. Stories were randomly chosen by putting their titles into a hat and 
blindly picking them. A sample of twenty percent of total stories was selected from each 
collection. Some collections were organized thematically, in which case a quasi-random 
sampling method was used to ensure that stories from each theme were represented. For the 
quasi-random sampling, titles from each theme, as opposed to all titles, were put into a hat and 
blindly picked and this was repeated until all themes were represented. In total, 73 folktales were 
sampled: 12 from Russia (Smith 1873), 11 from Finland (Jones, Kropf et al. 1889), 10 from 
Chile (Pino-Saavedra 1968) and 8 each from North America (Lum 1973), China (O'Brien 1990), 
South Africa (Brownlee 1938), the South Pacific (Hames 1969), and North Africa (Ashbranner 
and Davis 1959).  Table 1 lists the number of folktales by region. 
Table 1 
Book Title Number of 
Folktales 
Region 
Folk Tales from Chile 10 South America 
Russian Folk Tales 12 East Eurasia 
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Magyar Folk Tales 11 Mediterranean 
Lion & Jackal with 
other Native Folk Tales 
from South Africa 
8 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Chinese Myths and 
Legends 
8 East Eurasia 
The Lion’s Whiskers: 
Tales from High Africa 
8 Saharan Africa 
Folk Tales of North 
America 
8 North America 




After selecting the folktales two researchers who had read Barrett’s Counterintuitive 
Coding scheme (2008) but were otherwise unfamiliar with MCI theory, coded and quantified the 
counterintuitive properties of objects within each folktale.    
 
Coding Folktales 
The following is a description of methods used by researchers to code counterintuitive objects in 
folktales. This description focuses on detailing coding procedures more than explicating the 
rationale and justification for the procedures. A more in depth discussion of how and why these 
procedures were developed may be found in Barrett (2008).  




The Simplicity Rule 
Coders applied what Barrett deemed ‘The Simplicity Rule’ to each of the following six steps 
when coding objects’ counterintuitive properties. This rule, underpinned by evidence that  human 
cognitive systems generally strive for representational and computational efficiency and 
simplicity (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), states that when coding concepts, assume the simplest (i.e., 
least counterintuitive) conceptual representation that captures the object’s properties.  Examples 
of how the simplicity rule was applied to the six coding steps are described below.  
 
Step 1: Identify the basic level of membership 
 In the first step, coders identified a counterintuitive object’s basic level of membership. The 
basic level was the object categorization that minimized differences within members of the 
category and maximized differences between categories (Rosch et al., 1976). 
 Coders used the following heuristic for identifying the basic level, asking themselves “In 
one word, what is this object called?”  This one-word label (in English) became the object’s 
basic level.  Researchers recorded the object’s basic level word in all capital letters. Examples 
included “LADDER,” “FOX,” “HUMAN,” and “WIND.” If the basic level could not be 
identified initially, coders proceeded to Step 2, gathering information from the narrative to help 
determine the object’s basic level of membership. 
 
Step 2: Identify the ontological category or categories 
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After determining the object’s basic level, researchers determined in which of the following 
categories the object belonged: Spatial Entities, Solid Objects, Living Things that do not appear 
to be self-propelled, Animates, and Persons.1   
The five intuitive ontological categories were developed out of five expectation sets 
(Spatiality, Physicality, Biology, Animacy, and Mentality), which capture intuitive assumptions 
that cognitive developmentalists have identified as being held by young children (e.g., see Spelke 




Intuitive Expectation Set 
(with coding abbreviation) 
Properties Assumed 




Cohesion: move as connected whole 
Contact: physical contact required for launching or 
changing direction of movement 
Continuity: movement is continuous in space 
Solidity: cannot pass through or be passed through by 
other solid objects 
Tangibility 
 
1 These are intuitive ontological categories and do not necessarily map on to genuine ontological distinctions.  For 
the justification of these five categories as separate and different categories, please refer to Barrett (2008). 
2 Table 2 is adapted from Barrett, 2008. 




Biology (b) Growth & development 
Like begets like 
Natural composition 
Nourishment needs and processes to satisfy those needs  
Parts serve the whole to sustain life 
Vulnerability to injury & death Kind-specific essence 
Animacy (a) Goals 
“Self-propelled”  
Mentality (m) Reflective & representational mental states  and 
standard relationships among them and 
limitations of them 
 Self-awareness and consciousness  
Understand language & communication 
Universals (u) Consistency: assumptions apply continuously; past was 
like present, future will be like present 
Time and causation are unidirectional 
 
Differential activation of these five intuitive expectation sets break up each object into 
categories of Spatial Entities, Solid Objects, Living Things, Animates, and Persons. The 
relationship between expectation sets and intuitive ontological categories is not strictly 
hierarchical.  Solid objects assume and extend the properties of Spatiality but things intuitively 
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categorized as Animates do not necessarily activate the same expectations as Living Things. 
Robots, for example, can be conceptualized as goal-directed, self-propelled Animates but do not 
activate Biology assumptions.  Barrett’s proposed relationship of expectation sets to ontological 






































































































3 Table 3 is adapted from Barrett, 2008. 
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 Once researchers determined the ontological categories of an object, they proceeded to 
step three. If neither the basic level membership nor the ontological categories could be 
determined after step two, researchers stopped the coding process for that object. 
 
Step 3: Code transfers as superscript, capitalized prefixes, joined by + if necessary 
After determining the basic level membership and ontological category of an object, researchers 
coded counterintuitive transfers, or properties attributed to the object that came from a non-
native expectation set(s).  To illustrate, a talking broom would have received a transfer of 
mentality as brooms, being Solid Objects and not Persons, are not intuitively able to talk. 
Researchers noted transfers with superscript, capitalized prefixes so a talking broom would have 
been coded: 
MBROOM  
Researchers applied the simplicity rule as needed when coding transfers. Following the 
simplicity rule (that the least counterintuitive or “simplest” representation should be assumed), a 
TREE that both listened empathetically (a property from Mentality) and verbally communicated 
(another Mentality property) would have been coded MTREE as the entire set of Mentality 
expectations would have been transferred, not just one mental ability. Unless the narrative 
explicitly renounced certain properties from the same expectation set, researchers assumed the 
entire set had been transferred. 
Some transfers were also simplified because, as mentioned above, certain expectation 
sets presume others. For example, a flower that could sing (a property from Mentality) and dance 
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(an Animacy property) would have been coded MFLOWER instead of M+AFLOWER because 
Mentality presumes Animacy.  
 
Step 4:  Code breaches as superscript lowercase suffixes, joined by + if necessary 
Next researchers coded counterintuitive violations, or breaches of native expectation sets. A 
breach occurred when an object did not possess all of the properties associated with its 
ontological expectation set.  For example, an invisible ladder would have had a breach of 
physicality, as ladders are intuitively visible and visibility comes from the physicality 
expectation set. Breaches were coded with superscript, lowercase suffixes, so the invisible ladder 
would have been coded LADDERp 
Unlike transfers, a breach of one property did not necessarily presume that the entire 
intuitive expectation set had been violated.  In the case of the invisible ladder, it would not 
necessarily have been intangible as well as invisible. If the ladder were intangible as well as 
invisible, it would have been coded LADDERp+p.  
As with transfers, researchers applied the simplicity principle as necessary when coding 
breaches. If an object had numerous breaches, the ontological category was occasionally revised 
in keeping with the simplicity rule. To illustrate, if researchers had encountered an intangible, 
invisible brick that was able to pass through solid objects, the item perhaps initially conceived of 
as BRICK with three breaches of physicality, would have been more simply represented as 
VAPOR with a transfer of physicality properties (brick-like boundaries and shape).  
 
Step5: Code Breaches within Breaches using Parentheses 
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After coding breaches and transfers, researchers coded breaches of breaches. These always 
involved violations of universal rules and were coded with parentheses.  For example, a corpse 
that only came alive at night would have been coded (HUMANb)u. The lowercase b would have 
denoted a breach of biology as the human broke with intuitive biological expectations of 
mortality. The lowercase u would have denoted that the biology breach violated universal rules 
of consistency because the human only came back to life at night. In sum, the final coding 
notation, (HUMANb)u, would have demonstrated that the human had a breach of biology and that 
the biology breach violated universal rules. 
 
Step 6: Quantify Counterintuitiveness by totaling the number of symbolic letters  
In the final step, researchers determined the counterintuitive score of each object by adding the 
superscript letters attached to the object. Each letter added one point to the overall 
counterintuitive score.  Please see Table 4 for examples from the folktales.  




  Table 4 
Concept (public representation) Coding Counterintuitiveness 
Score 
A woman with jet black hair and eyes 
A dead woman 
A dead woman who comes back to life 
A dead woman who comes back to life only at 
night 
A dead woman who comes back to life and 
takes off her head only at night 
A brown horse with four legs and a long tail 
A horse that talks 
A talking tiger that gives birth to domestic 
cats  
An axe that can move on its own  

































A total of 73 myths were used to examine the reliability and effectiveness of Barrett’s coding 
scheme for counterintuitive properties in objects.  Two coders independently applied the coding 
scheme to each folktale and noted objects and persons with counterintuitive features. Data was 
collected at two different time points.  The first time point included all regions except North 
America and South America.  In the second time point, data was collected using the folktales 
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from North America and Chile (South America). Using the coding system, coders quantified 
each object by identifying the level of membership and also the ontological categories that were 
counterintuitive.   
 
Intercoder reliability 
Concordance between coders was high at 92.6 percent agreement.  To calculate the consistency 
between coders, Kendall’s Tau-b was used because the coding scale contained ordinal data 
(Svensson, 2001).  The reliability between the two coders was highly consistent for the first data 
collection, τ = .875, p = .0001 (2-tailed, N = 86 counterintuitive objects).  Likewise, the second 
data collection yielded high inter-coder reliability, τ = .856, p = .001(2-tailed, N = 35 
counterintuitive items).  This high concordance gives us confidence of the utility of the CI-
Scheme for analyzing written cultural materials.   
Between coders, there were nine items that were in disagreement; seven of the 
disagreements occurred in the first trial and two in the second trial4.  All nine disagreements 
involved dead humans with varying breaches of biology, physicality, and universals5.  
Application of the Simplicity Rule typically resolved disagreements.  For instance, in the case of 
a skull that spoke, by appealing to the Simplicity Rule coders decided that this object would be 
better coded as an Object with a transfer of mentality than as a human with breaches of biology 
 
4 Five of these inconsistencies were due to objects involving a corpse/dead person/object coming to life with 
breaches and transfers of various ontological categories.  The largest proportion of disagreements concerned the use 
of universals, specifically surrounding the ambiguity of time e.g. when dead corpses/objects would appear and 
disappear.   
5 Broadly, universals were difficult to code because mythic tales were not explicit whether, for example, a dead 
corpse could be ‘alive’ during the day, rather than solely at night just after the cock crowed at midnight.  Due to this 
ambiguity, the raters’ responses varied.  The decision was made that under circumstances where there were explicit 
times when objects/persons appeared and disappeared and these correlated with an event (e.g. a crow from a cock at 
midnight), a universal breach was given.  
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and physicality. To further clarify, the disagreements were not in the coding of these figures as 
much as in how to interpret a counterintuitive figure in an ambiguous folktale; both coders 
agreed that if the myth were interpreted one way, the coding would have been in agreement6. 
 
Counterintuitive objects per folktale 
Independently, the two coders found 101 counterintuitive objects in common and an additional 
15 objects were detected by one or the other coder.  Upon discussion coders agreed on all 116 
objects.  The number of counterintuitive objects per folktale ranged from zero (20 stories, 27.4 
percent, had no counterintuitive objects7) to eleven,8 with a mean of 1.59 counterintuitive objects 
per tale (SD = 1.83).  Twenty-three stories (31.5 percent) had one counterintuitive object and 18 
myths (24.7 percent) had two counterintuitive objects.  So for the 53 tales that contained 
counterintuitive objects, 79.2 percent (N = 42) contained 1 or 2 counterintuitive objects.  Figure 1 
illustrates this distribution.  
Figure 1 
 
6 In an ethnographic context many such disagreements could be resolved by further questioning of informants. 
7 There were 19 myths without any coded counterintuitive object between raters. After the raters completed 
individual coding, the number rose to 20 myths without any counterintuitive objects.  The latter issue surrounded a 
myth that included cannibalism.  After debating the definition of counterintuitiveness, raters agreed that eating one’s 
own species was shocking (and disgusting, perhaps) but not counterintuitive.   
8 The largest proportion of myths contained 1 counterintuitive item (31.5 percent, N=23), no items (27.4 percent, 
N=20), or 2 items (26 percent, N=19). 






Counterintuitiveness Scores of Objects 
The majority of counterintuitive objects (99.0 percent, N = 115) had a counterintuitive score of 1 
or 2. Specifically, 108 objects had a counterintuitive score of 1, seven had a counterintuitive 
score of 2, and only one object had a counterintuitive score of 3.  There were no objects with a 
score higher than three. 
   
Most Frequent Types of Counterintuitive Objects 
Nearly all counterintuitive objects (98.2 percent, N = 114) were agents, that is, objects that 
activated either Mentality or Animacy expectations.   Most counterintuitive agents (61.0 percent, 
N = 69) were animals with a transfer of mentality, which were coded with 100 percent agreement 
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between coders.  Other types included people with counterintuitive properties and artifacts that 





Discussion & Conclusion 
The aims of the present study were (1) to determine whether Barrett’s CI-Scheme could be 
reliably applied to cultural materials, (2) to better determine the location of the cognitive 
optimum predicted by Boyer and also (3) to determine whether counterintuitive agents were 
more common in folktales than other types of counterintuitive concepts.   
 The CI-Scheme was able to be applied with high agreement between the two coders 
without special expertise or extensive training.  These results suggest that the CI-Scheme may be 
used as a common strategy for indentifying counterintuitive objects and quantifying 
counterintuitiveness at least in written materials.  The demonstrated inter-rater reliability with 
written materials further suggests the CI-Scheme’s application to generating and evaluating 
materials developed for and used in experimentally testing the MCI Theory (see Gregory & 
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Barrett, forthcoming, for an example).  Previous studies investigating Boyer’s theory have 
produced inconsistent results possibly because the experiments have lacked a common, 
systematic method for determining the degree to which tested objects were counterintuitive 
(Gonce et al., 2006; Norenzayan et al., 2006; Tweney et al., 2006).  Due to the ambiguity and 
weak agreement in operationalizing ‘counterintuitiveness’ in past research, it is hard to evaluate 
the evidence to date.  Using a standard measure of counterintuitive properties could reduce such 
variation between studies and advance the empirical investigation of MCI theory and other 
theories related to counterintuitive concepts. 
The present findings also bear upon where the ‘cognitive optimum’ predicted by Boyer 
lies. Similar to Lisdorf (2004), the majority of counterintuitive concepts classified had only one 
counterintuitive property, that is, a counterintuitiveness score of 1.  Of the 116 counterintuitive 
objects that were classified only seven items scored 2, and only one had a score of 3.  Thus, it 
seems that for folktales, there is a cognitive optimum level of one counterintuitive property and 
those concepts with more than one property (or a counterintuitiveness score greater than 1) are 
less likely to become widely-recurrent cultural representations.  
Boyer has argued that counterintuitive intentional agent concepts in particular enjoy a 
transmission advantage over other counterintuitive concepts (2001).  In the collections of 
folktales, myths, and legends sampled, this is precisely what was found.  Of the 116 objects 
coded, 114 objects were agents of which the most common classification was animal with a 
transfer of a human-like mind.  Further, these were the most reliable to code, as there was 100 
percent agreement between coders.  Perhaps these concepts were easier to code and widespread 
in folktales because of Boyer’s suggestion that there is minimal inferential effort when 
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conceptualizing a counterintuitive agent.  Attributing an animal with a human-like mind seems 
almost a natural property as we can easily imagine that animals have some mental states already. 
Further, agents may have an additional advantage because they can be used to explain or bring 
about many different states of affairs and hence, can help to move stories along.  Agents initiate 
and can cause these things to happen rather than only being recipients of action.   
Similar to Norenzayan et al. (2006), we did not find that folktales typically included a 
large number of counterintuitive objects.    Norenzayan et al. (2006) questioned the relatively 
low frequency of counterintuitive objects in their results, wondering why counterintuitive items 
that have proposed transmissive advantages did not dominate folktales.  They proposed that a 
folktale may be a single unit of transmission and, hence, there may be a cognitive optimal 
number of counterintuitive objects per myth.  Norenzayan et al. (2006) found that two to three 
counterintuitive objects seemed to be the cognitively optimal number for stories, suggesting that 
MCI narratives could be more culturally successful.  Our results showed that over three-fourths 
of the folktales contained only 1 or 2 counterintuitive objects.  As Norenzayan et al. (2006) 
proposed, perhaps there is a cognitive optimal number for whole narrative structures as well.  
That is, even if an object with a counterintuitiveness score of one balances attention-demanding 
salience with ease of representation and communication, too many of these minimally 
counterintuitive objects in the same narrative could cumulatively produce conceptual difficulty.  
One or two MCI objects may be optimal in a narrative as a whole.  Narratives with a small 
number of MCI objects may have mnemonic advantage as they activate our inferential systems 
with little cognitive effort and also contain concepts that minimally violate our intuitive 
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expectations sets so that these ideas are interesting and provoke further interpretation and 
likely, further transmission (Boyer, 2001; Sperber & Wilson, 1986).  
The current study only examined counterintuitive objects in folktales.   We chose 
folktales largely because they were likely to contain concepts that have achieved ‘success’ by 
being passed down through various generations and they were likely to contain MCI concepts.  
Nevertheless, researchers acknowledge that as written distillations of oral stories, these folktales 
could have over-estimated the amount of counterintuitiveness in the stories because the written 
versions could have combined several oral versions of the tales and such amalgamations would 
not have been subject to the same mnemonic constraints of verbal storytelling.  Even so, the CI-
Scheme could be applied to other cultural texts, for example religious writings, or to images to 
generate comparisons.  Results regarding the optimum number of counterintuitive properties per 
text and the optimum number of counterintuitive properties per object may vary depending on 
the type of text in which they occur. For example, it may be that cultural materials with more 
cultural scaffolding differ in terms of the amount of counterintuitive concepts they contain 
compared to materials with less cultural scaffolding. It is likely that oral transmission selects for 
folktales that are minimally counterintuitive and it may be that texts transmitted in written forms 
or in images are not subject to such selection pressure.  Additionally, the findings of the current 
study, while theoretically consistent with some tenants of MCI theory, should be replicated 
before they are taken to be representative of successfully transmitted cultural materials or, even, 
of all folktales. 
The CI-Scheme could also be applied to ethnographic texts. A systematic method for 
quantifying the counterintuitive concepts and counterintuitive properties per concept within a 
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culture could allow for more scientific comparisons of different cultures. Application of the 
CI-scheme to ethnographic materials could also allow for the tracking of counterintuitive 
concepts within a culture across time.  
At least for folktales, it seems, the CI-Scheme can be reliably used to code for 
counterintuitive objects as demonstrated by high inter-coder reliability.  Using the CI-Scheme, 
the results of this study suggest that the cognitive optimum Boyer predicts falls at a score of one: 
one counterintuitive feature or being minimally counterintuitive appears optimal for successful 
cultural transmission. Further, as predicted, we found counterintuitive agent concepts—
particularly intentional agents—to be overrepresented among counterintuitive concepts.  
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